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ABstrACt
Since the 1990’s, institutional factors have been regarded as playing important roles in stimulating foreign direct 
investments (FDI). However, empirical studies on their importance in affecting FDI are still lacking, especially in regards 
to small open economies. This paper attempts to investigate the role of institutions in regards to the inflow of FDI in 
Malaysia’s small open economy of Malaysia. Using the bounds testing approach (ARDL model), empirical findings reveal 
that a long-run relationship exists between FDI and institutional variables. Several institutional variables are found to 
play prominent roles in influencing the inflow of FDI, namely governmental stability, bureaucracy and corruption. Thus, 
providing and maintaining the quality of domestic institutions alongside the implementation of FDI friendly policies 
would be beneficial to Malaysian economic growth stemming from foreign investment.
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introduCtion
it is generally accepted that Foreign direct investment (Fdi) 
is a key driver in promoting long-term economic growth, 
particularly in less-developed countries (ldC’s) that have 
experienced a shortage of capital accumulation for their 
development. Verdier (2008) argues that domestic savings 
are linked to capital inflows where low savings rates 
attract more inflows of capital. Indeed, most of the ldC’s 
that have effectively attracted more Fdi have consistently 
experienced economic growth. thus, most of the ldC’s 
are highly dependent on Fdi as a mechanism of economic 
growth and have been trying to attract foreign investors, 
particularly multinational enterprises (mne’s), by reducing 
barriers to Fdi and offering various tax incentives and 
subsidies (herzer 2008). As a result, most ldC’s have been 
competing with each other in order to attract investment 
from mne’s, particularly the foreign investors from 
developed countries. 
 there is consensus among academic economists 
that Fdi has a positive effect on economic growth. the 
significant effect of Fdi on economic growth has motivated 
many researchers to study the main factors that generally 
determine the inflow of Fdi into countries. the most 
important factors that determine the inflow of Fdi are 
domestic market size; trade openness; cost of labour; 
persistency in economic growth; and low taxes and tariffs 
(Ang 2008). 
 however, most of the prior studies have not taken into 
account the role of institutions on Fdi. since the late 1990’s, 
the literature on Fdi has begun to focus on the quality of 
institutions as one of the key factors in explaining the 
inflow of Fdi.  Quere et al. (2007) provides three reasons 
why the quality of institutions may matter for attracting Fdi. 
First, by raising productivity prospects, good governance 
and infrastructure may attract foreign investors. second, 
poor institutions can bring additional costs to Fdi (for 
example, in the case of corruption). the third reason stems 
from sunk costs, where Fdi is particularly vulnerable to 
uncertainties arising from poor governmental efficiency; 
policy reversals; and general weaknesses regarding the 
enforcement of property rights and the domestic legal 
systems. essentially, by maintaining quality governmental 
institutions, more investments can be attracted and the 
economic growth process can be expedited. 
 in the malaysian economy, Fdi has been seen as a key 
driver in promoting economic growth in export-oriented 
industries. Policy reforms – including the introduction of 
the investment incentive Act in 1968, the establishment 
of free trade zones in the early 1970s, and the provision 
of export incentives alongside the acceleration of open 
economy in the 1980s – led to a surge in Fdi in the late 
1980s (Ang 2008, 2009). Aside from policy factors, 
it is generally believed that sound macroeconomic 
management, sustained economic growth, the presence of 
a well functioning system, political stability, relatively low 
set-up costs, and a sufficiently trained labour force have 
made malaysia an attractive prospect for Fdi. 
 As can be seen in Figure 1, malaysia experienced 
large Fdi inflows in comparison to neighbouring countries 
during the early 1990’s. Policy reforms, beginning as early 
as 1968, contributed to malaysia’s success in attracting 
Fdi. in 1992, malaysia received large amounts of Fdi, even 
higher than singapore. however, following the 1997-1998 
Asian financial crisis, Malaysia began to receive less Fdi in 
comparison to neighbouring countries. initially, thailand 
overtook malaysia in regards to the receipt of Fdi in 1998, 
followed by indonesia in 2005. By 2009, all of malaysia’s 
neighbouring countries had become more successful in 
attracting Fdi.
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Source: united nations Conference on trade and investment, Foreign direct investment database.
Figure 1. Fdi Inflows of Malaysia and Neighbouring Countries, 1989 – 2009 (usd mil.)
in term of macroeconomic conditions, malaysia is 
relatively better than neighbouring countries, with the 
exception of singapore. this indicates that policy variables 
and sound macroeconomic conditions are inadequate in 
explaining the inflow of Fdi. indeed, good institutions 
are believed to have positive influences on economic 
development through the promotion of domestic as well 
as foreign investments. thus, it is expected that the quality 
of institutions play a vital role in attracting the inflow of 
Fdi into malaysia. 
 this paper contributes to the existing literature in 
three ways. First, this paper examines the determinants of 
Fdi inflow in Malaysia by focusing on several institutional 
variables, namely law and order, governmental stability, 
corruption, bureaucracy, and investment profile. Although 
Ang (2008) and marial and ngie (2009) study the 
determinants of Fdi in malaysia, none of them consider 
the role of institutional variables in their models. A 
better understanding of the role of institutions would be 
helpful to malaysian leaders and policy makers when 
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to sustain 
and encourage the inflow of mnes. second, this paper 
uses a recent econometric technique, namely Ardl or 
the bounds testing procedure, proposed by Pesaran et 
al. (2001). The method is sufficient to deal with a small 
sample size and allows a mixture of the time series 
variables i(0) and i(1) to be collectively estimated. third, 
many previous studies investigate the role of institutions 
by using cross sectional data or panel data methodology 
(see Busse and hefeker (2007); and Quere et al. (2007)). 
these techniques, however, limit our understanding of the 
effect of institutions in an individual country. thus, our 
study on malaysia will shed some light on the importance 
of institutions in attracting Fdi to a small open economy. 
Our findings reveal that a long-run relationship exists 
between Fdi inflows and institutional variables. Several 
institutional variables – such as governmental stability, 
bureaucracy, and corruption – are found to play important 
roles in influencing the inflow of Fdi. 
 the structure of this paper is organized as follows. 
section 2 provides a short review of the literature by 
focusing on the effects of institutional variables on Fdi. 
section 3 presents the econometric methodology, focusing 
on definitions of the variables of interest as well as the 
Ardl model. the empirical results are discussed in section 
4, and, finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the 
study. 
literAture reView
the literature relating to institutions and Fdi is mainly 
connected to the study of the impact of the quality of 
institutions on Fdi inward flows. An early study by Wheeler 
and mody (1992) examines this issue in relation to u.s. 
firms. The investigation of 13 risk factor components 
(including bureaucracy, political stability, corruption, and 
the legal system quality) does not find that the quality of 
institutions significantly impacts the location of U.S foreign 
affiliates. According to Schmieding (1993), institutions 
encompass not only bureaucracies and administration, but 
also, more importantly, the entire body of formal laws, 
rules and regulations, as well as the informal conventions 
and patterns of behaviour that constitute the non-budgetary 
constraints under which economic agents can pursue their 
own individuals ends. in addition, the quality of institutions 
is closely related to reducing information asymmetries, 
as high quality institutions can channel information about 
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market conditions, goods and participants, which in turn 
encourages investment, either domestic or foreign. indeed, 
the deeper understanding of the role of institutions in 
stimulating the inflow of Fdi is pivotal for developing 
countries in order to design an appropriate Fdi-friendly 
policy.
 other empirical studies have supported the affect 
of institutional variables on Fdi. wei (1997; 2000) for 
instance, finds that uncertainty in regards to corruption 
has negative effects on locations chosen for Fdi. this is 
due to the fact that corruption involves additional costs for 
doing business because the investors have to bribe officials 
in order to get licenses and permits. Besides corruption, 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) also find that governmental 
stability; internal and external conflict; ethnic tensions; 
law and order; democratic accountability of government; 
and the quality of bureaucracy are highly significant in 
determining Fdi inflows in the sample of 83 developing 
countries. kaufman et al. (1999) demonstrate that political 
instability and violence; governmental effectiveness; 
regulatory burden; rule of law; and graft play a vital 
role in attracting inward Fdi. Brunetti and weder (1998) 
argue that there is a negative link between institutional 
uncertainty and private investment. in comparison, lee and 
Mansfield (1996) find a positive relationship between Fdi 
and intellectual property protection.  du et al. (2008) argue 
that u.s.-based mne’s prefer to invest in regions in China 
that have better protection of intellectual property rights; 
a lower degree of governmental intervention in business 
operation; a lower level of governmental corruption; 
and better contract enforcement. using a wider range of 
institutional variables, daude and stein (2007) demonstrate 
that inward Fdi is significant influenced by the quality of 
institutions.
 A recent study by du et al. (2012) examines the roles 
of economic institutions and cultural distances on Fdi 
locations in the Chinese mainland. The findings indicate 
that the foreign invested enterprises (Fies) from the source 
countries/areas that are culturally more remote from China 
often exhibit a stronger aversion to regions with weaker 
economic institutions. Daniele and Marani (2011) find that 
there is a negative relationship between organized crime 
(an indicator of quality of institutions) and Fdi in italy. the 
study demonstrates that crime is a deterrent for foreign 
investors, suggesting that a high level of crime is indicative 
of an unfavourable local socio-institutional environment 
for Fdi.
 in the malaysian context, studies relating to the 
determinants of Fdi have been done by Ang (2008), and 
Marial and Ngie (2009). Ang (2008) finds that increases in 
the level of financial development, infrastructure, and trade 
openness promote Fdi. on the other hand, higher statutory 
corporate tax rate and appreciation of the real exchange rate 
appear to discourage Fdi inflows. The results also suggest 
that higher macroeconomic uncertainty induces further 
Fdi inflow. In comparison, Marial and Ngie (2009) find 
that the inflow of Fdi in Malaysia is positively influenced 
by real exchange rate, gdP growth, and infrastructure; and 
negatively influenced by exports. 
 despite the numerous studies on the determinants 
of Fdi in malaysia, none of them have considered the 
effects of institutional variables on the inflow of Fdi. we 
provide a novel contribution to the existing literature by 
presenting the first empirical evidence relating to a small 
open economy (i.e. Malaysia). Specifically, we investigate 
the effects of several aspects of institutional quality on the 
inflow of Fdi, specifically law and order; governmental 
stability; bureaucracy; corruption; and investment 
profile.
estimAtion methods
dAtA And the deFinition oF VAriABles
the data used in this study consists of yearly frequency 
spanning from 1984 until 2009. The aggregate inflow 
of Fdi data set is collected from International Financial 
Statistics (iFs) database, while the data for institutional 
variables are from the international Country risk guide 
(iCrg) database. the data concerning Fdi is transformed 
into natural logarithms, whereas the data of institutional 
variables are represented by percentage points (in level 
form). 
 We do not include the common factors that influence 
Fdi identified by Ang (2008) and Marial and Ngie (2009) 
for two reasons. First, our concern is specifically on the 
role of institutions on Fdi inflow that were previously 
ignored. the importance of the common factors is well 
established. second, analyzing all other variables together 
with institutional factors may cause multi-collinearity 
problems in instances where the institutional variables may 
be correlated with other macroeconomic variables, such as 
high levels of human capital, open market and advanced 
financial intermediaries (Papaioannou 2009).
institutionAl VAriABles
this study considers five political risk components: 
governmental stability; investment profile; corruption; law 
and order; and bureaucracy quality in the investigation of 
the effects of institutional variables on the inflow of Fdi 
into malaysia. these variables are measured using a points 
system. each indicator is scaled either from 0 to 12 points, 
0 to 6 points, and 0 to 4 points higher value indicates 
better institutions and less political risks and vice versa. 
Specifically, the detailed definition and the explanation of 
the institutions variables are as follow: 
goVernmentAl stABility-12 Points
this measures an assessment both of the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared program, and its ability 
to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of 
the three components, each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of 0 point. A score of 
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four points equates to very low risk, while a score of 0 
points indicates a very high risk. the subcomponents 
are governmental unity, legislative strength, and popular 
support.
inVestment ProFile – 12 Points
this is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to 
investment that are not covered by other political, 
economic and financial risk components. The risk rating 
assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with 
a maximum score of four points and minimum score of 
0 points. A score of 4 points equates to very low risk, 
while a score of 0 points indicates a very high risk. the 
subcomponents are contract viability/expropriation, profits 
repatriation and payment delays.
CorruPtion - 6 Points
Corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several 
reasons. First, it distorts the economic and financial 
environment. second, it reduces the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume 
positions of power through patronage rather than ability. 
Finally, it introduces inherent instability into political 
processes. Corruption can make it difficult to conduct 
business effectively and, in some cases, may force 
the withdrawal or withholding of an investment. six 
points indicate less corruption, while 0 points indicate a 
significant political risk to the investors.
lAw And order – 6 Points
To assess the ‘law’ element, the strength and impartially of 
the legal system is considered, while the ‘order’ element 
is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  thus, 
a country can enjoy a high rating of ‘3’ in terms of its 
judicial system, but a low rating of ‘1’ if it suffers from a 
very high crime rate as a result of the law being routinely 
ignored due to ineffective enforcement.
BureAuCrACy QuAlity – 4 Points
the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy 
is another factor that reflects the tendency of governments 
to minimize revisions of policy upon a transfer of power, 
usually following an election. therefore, high points 
are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the 
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services. in 
these low risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be 
somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to 
have an established mechanism for recruitment and 
training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a 
strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change 
in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy 
formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. 
eConometriC modeling
in order to examine the long-run relationship and dynamic 
interaction between Fdi and institutions, this study 
employs an Ardl model. in general, there are three steps 
in estimating the model. The first step is to estimate the 
long-run relationship among the variables. this is done by 
testing the significance of the lagged levels of the variables 
in the error correction form of the underlying Ardl model. 
our Ardl model can be written as follows;
[1]
where, lFsi is log of Fdi, LAWOR is law and order,  
CORRUPT is corruption, BUREAU is bureaucracy,  GSTAB 
is governmental stability, and INVPRO is the investment 
profile. The selection of the optimum lagged orders of 
the Ardl model are based on Akaike information criteria. 
in order to test cointegration among the variables, the 
wald F-statistics for testing the joint hypotheses has to be 
compared with the critical values as tabulated by Pesaran 
et al. (2001). 
 the joint hypotheses to be tested are;
 if the F-statistics is higher than the upper bound critical 
value, the null hypothesis (h0) is rejected, indicating that 
there is a long run relationship between the lagged level 
variables in the model.  in contrast, if the F-statistic falls 
below the lower bound, then the h0 cannot be rejected and 
no long run relationship exists. however, if the F-statistics 
falls in between the upper bound and lower bound critical 
values, the inference is inconclusive. At this condition, the 
order of integration of each variable should be determined 
before any inference can be made. 
 in the second step, once the cointegration is established, 
the conditional ARDL (p,q,r,s,t,u) long-run model of the 
determinants of the LFDIt can be estimated as below:
                                                                                                                                                      
 
[2]
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in the final step, we obtain the short-run dynamic 
parameters by estimating an error correction model (ECM) 
associated with the long-run estimates. This is specified 
as follows:
[3]
where, φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4, φ5, φ6 are the short-run dynamic 
coefficients of the model’s convergence to equilibrium, 
and v is the speed of adjustment. the expected signs for 
all the institutional variables are positive, which indicates 
that better quality institutions will stimulate more foreign 
investment.  
I. Estimated Model
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probability
LFDIt-1 2.236 1.936* 0.094
LAWORt-1 -3.553 -3.088** 0.018
CORRUPTt-1 0.874 2.415** 0.046
BEREAUt-1 6.656 2.751** 0.028
GSTABt-1 -1.034 -2.366** 0.049
INVPROt-1 -1.937 -2.018* 0.083
ΔLFDIt-1 -2.594 -3.163** 0.016
ΔLFDIt-2 -1.370 -2.427** 0.046
ΔLAWORt-1 1.154 0.742 0.164
ΔLAWORt-2 4.336 3.362** 0.012
ΔCORRUPTt-1 4.116 3.270** 0.014
ΔBEREAUt-1 -0.912 -1.373 0.212
ΔGSTABt-1 0.751 2.404** 0.047
ΔGSTABt-2 0.596 1.481 0.182
ΔINVPROt-1 0.304 0.999 0.351
ΔINVPROt-2 -0.081 -0.361 0.728
II. Model Criteria/Goodness of Fit
r2 = 0.836             Adjusted  r2 = 0.484                F-statistics = 5.64(0.034)**
III.Diagnostic Checking
Ar(2) = 0.678(0.545)                      Ar(4) = 0.378 (0-775)
ArCh (2) = 2.288 (0.130)             ArCh (4) = 1.935 (0.160)
jB = 2.723 (0.255)                          reset = 3.072 (0.153)
tABle 1. estimation of model
Note: * and ** indicate significance at 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. Probability values are quoted 
in brackets. Ar(i) and ArCh (i) for i=2,4 denote lm-type Breusch-godfrey serial Correlation lm and ArCh test 
respectively to test for the presence of serial correlation and ArCh effects at lag i. jB and reset stand for jarque-Bera 
normality test, and Ramsey Regression specification error test respectively.
emPiriCAl results
in this section, we report the results of long-run relationship 
of the Ardl model (table 1 and 2) as well as the long-run 
and short-run determinants of Fdi (table 3 and 4).  the 
empirical results are crucial in explaining the effects of the 
institutional variables on Fdi inflow in Malaysia.
 table 1 shows the estimation results of equation (1) 
using ARDL (2,2,1,1,2,2). the r-square indicates that 83.6 
percent of the variation in the response variables can be 
explained by the institutional variables. the robustness of 
the model is confirmed by several diagnostic tests, such as 
the Breusch-godfrey serial correlation lm test; the ArCh 
test; the jacque-Bera normality test; and the ramsey reset 
specification test. All tests reveal that the model has the 
desired econometric properties, insofar as it has a correct 
functional form and the model’s residuals are serially 
uncorrelated, normally distributed and homoscedastic. 
therefore, the results reported are valid for reliable 
interpretation.
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 in table 2, the results of the bound cointegration test 
show that the null hypothesis of H0: β1 = β2= β3 = β4= β5 
= β6= 0 against its alternatives H0: β1 ≠ β2≠ β3 ≠ β4≠ β5 = 
β6= 0 is rejected at the 10 percent significance level. The 
computed F-statistics of 3.54 is greater than the upper 
bound value of 3.23 at 10 percent significance level. 
this indicates that there exists a long-run relationship 
between Fdi and the institutional variables (law and order, 
corruption, governmental stability, investment profile, and 
bureaucracy).
 the second step is to estimate the long-run model 
of the determinants of Fdi. table 3 reports the estimation 
results. As can be seen, three institutional variables – 
tABle 3. Estimation of Long-run Coefficients 
regressors Coefficient standard error t-ratio Probability
LFDIt-1 0.110 0.210 0.523 0.607
ΔLFDIt-1 0.343 0.214 1.597 0.127
ΔLAWORt-1 0.570 0.243 2.333** 0.031
ΔCORRUPT-1 1.198 0.364 3.288*** 0.004
ΔBEREAUt 0.134 0.063 2.130** 0.047
ΔINVPROt 0.128 0.152 0.839 0.412
r-square
durbin-watson 
F-statistics
Prob (F-statistics)
0.692
2.193
6.745
0.000
Note: 
Ardl (1,1,1,1,0,0) lag for each variable is selected based on AiC. dependent variable is lFdi
***, **, *  represent a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The results of unit root tests are discussed in the appendix. 
tABle 2. Bounds test for Cointegration Analysis
Critical Value (k=6) lower Bound Value, i(0) upper Bound Value, i(1)
10% 2.12 3.23
5% 2.45 3.61
1% 3.15 4.43
Notes: 
The computed F-Statistics in the estimation model in equation (1) is 3.54 (significant at 10 percent significance level). Critical values are cited from Pesaran et al. (2001), 
table Ci(iii), Case iii (unrestricted intercept and no trend).
corruption, governmental stability, and bureaucracy – are 
positively and statistically significant, at least at 5 percent 
significance level, in influencing the inflow of Fdi. this 
indicates that the level of corruption, governmental 
stability, and bureaucracy in malaysia would affect the 
inflow of Fdi to Malaysia. These findings have important 
policy implications for leaders and policy-makers in 
malaysia as it indicates an imperative for offering better 
quality domestic institutions by minimizing the element 
of corruption, maintaining or increasing governmental 
stability, and reducing governmental bureaucracy in order 
to attract a greater inflow of Fdi. 
tABle 4. estimation of short-run (VeCm) model
regressors Coefficient standard error t-ratio Probability
ECMt-1 -1.253 0.293 -4.265*** 0.001
ΔLFDIt-1 0.107 0.214 0.500 0.623
ΔLAWORt-1 -0.273 0.234 -1.169 0.260
ΔCORRUPT-1
0.779 0.537 1.451 0.166
ΔBEREAUt 1.049 0.500 2.098* 0.052
ΔGSTABt 0.264 0.100 2.641** 0.018
ΔINVPROt -0.193 0.143 -1.351 0.195
r-square
durbin-watson
F-statistic
Prob (F-statistics)
0.678
1.937
4.816
0.004
Note: 
ARDL (1,1,1,0,0,0) lag for each variable is selected based on AIC. Dependent variable is ∆LFDI
***, **, *  is significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
  67
 table 4 reports the estimation results of the short-
run model using ARDL (1,1,1,1,0,0). As shown, only two 
variables, bureaucracy and governmental stability, are 
positively and statistically significant with at least a 1 
percent significance level in influencing the inflow of Fdi. 
the error correction model (eCm) variable, which explains 
the speed of the adjustment, is also significant at a 1 percent 
significance level. This indicates that there is a long-run 
causality from institutional variables to the inflow of Fdi. 
ConClusion
Although the determinants of Fdi have been examined 
extensively in previous studies, less attention has been 
given to examining the role of institutional variables upon 
Fdi inflows, particularly in a small open economy such 
as malaysia. this paper expands the existing literature 
by providing new empirical evidence concerning the 
role of quality institutions in regards to the inflow of 
Fdi. Specifically, we examine institutional factors that 
affect the inflow of Fdi into malaysia, namely corruption, 
governmental stability, bureaucracy, law and order, and 
investment profile. Considering the short annual sample 
size, the Ardl, or bound testing procedure, is used to 
examine the long-run relationship and the causality 
direction (long-run, and short-run) among the variables 
of interest. 
 The main findings can be summarized as follows. 
First, there is a long-run relationship between institutional 
variables and Fdi inflow to malaysia. second, in the 
long-run and short-run, several institutional variables are 
statistically significant in influencing the inflow of Fdi, 
namely governmental stability, the level of corruption and 
bureaucracy. 
 the findings provide three important policy 
implications for malaysian leaders and policy makers. 
First, maintaining governmental stability must be a high 
priority as this not only leads to better management 
of the country, but also attracts foreign mnes to make 
investments in malaysia. such a strategy is necessary 
for supporting long-term economic growth in malaysia. 
second, the malaysian government must work towards the 
elimination of corruption in the country since high levels of 
corruption have been proven to deter foreign investment. 
third, working towards eliminating bureaucracy that 
hinders the prospects of Fdi growth in malaysia is another 
strategy that may be implemented. in summary, providing 
quality institutions in malaysia should be a priority as 
the existence of such institutions creates a Fdi-friendly 
environment and, in turn, will stimulate continuous inflows 
of Fdi. with malaysia lagging behind its neighbours in 
relation to attracting Fdi, the above mentioned actions 
appear to be urgent.
 this study possesses two principal limitations. First, as 
mentioned earlier, explaining the determinants of Fdi inflow 
usually involves macro variables, such as a well-developed 
financial system (financial deepening); favourable growth 
performance; high trade openness; excellent infrastructure 
development; and low country risk, as well as attractive 
fiscal and monetary incentives. We do not include these 
variables in our analysis as the use of these variables will 
only increase the number of independent variables. using 
too many parameters in the model will result in the loss 
of degree of freedom.   in addition, this study does not 
take into account other important institutional variables 
which can also influence behaviour relating to foreign 
investment. For instance, good property rights protection, a 
good quality of education system, no risk of expropriation 
and dimensions of market efficiency are also important and 
should be considered in the formulation of policy by the 
government. 
 second, an institutional variable is often inadequate to 
explain the behaviour of mne’s. therefore, good interaction 
between institutional variables and other macro variables, 
such as a well-developed financial system (financial 
deepening); favourable growth performance; high trade 
openness; excellent infrastructure development; and low 
country risk, as well as attractive fiscal and monetary 
incentives, are also vital in attracting greater levels of 
inflow of Fdi to the host countries. in fact, these variables 
are complementary to each other. For instance, the existence 
of quality institutions means very little if the host countries 
(particularly ldC’s) do not have well-developed financial 
systems, excellent infrastructure and other macro variables 
that help to maintain the inflow of foreign investment. 
therefore, further studies should consider testing the 
hypothesis that the interaction between institutional quality 
and other macro variables has a separate influence on the 
Fdi inflow to the host countries. 
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APPendiX
tABle A1. results of the unit root tests
Panel A: level form, i(0) 
Variable
AdF Philip-Perron (PP)
Constant and no trend Constant and with trend Constant and no trend Constant and with trend
lFdi -2.026     (1) -3.109     (4) -2.234    (2) -2.177   (1)
CorruPt -1.694     (1) -2.247     (2) -1.439    (2) -2.080   (2)
lAwor -4.863*** (3) -4.711*** (3) -2.163    (3) -2.092   (2)
BureAu -1.520     (4) -3.586*    (3) -1.559    (2) -2.142   (1)
gstAB -3.209*** (5) -2.264     (2) -1.680    (2) -1.641   (1)
inVPro -1.973     (1) -4.307**  (1) -1.639    (2) 2.922    (2)
Panel B : First difference, i(1)
lFdi -3.522**   (2) -3.602*   (1) -5.718***  (2) -5.720*** (1)
CorruPt -3.284**   (1) -2.498    (2) -4.576***  (1) -4.643*** (1)
lAw -2.965*    (1) -6.235*** (4) -3.156**   (3) -3.195     (1)
BureAu -3.052**   (2) -3.142    (1) -4.326***  (1) -4.364**  (1)
gstAB -3.640**   (1) -3.646    (1) -3.638**   (2) -3.680**  (1)
inVPro -4.033***  (1) -3.943** (2) -3.892*** (2) -3.859**  (2)
Note: number in parenthesis is the optimum lag based on Akaike information criteria (AiC). the null hypothesis is that the series is non-stationary, or contains a unit root. 
the rejection of the null hypothesis for both AdF and PP tests is based on the mackinnon (1994) critical value. Critical values for the AdF and PP test without a trend are: 
-3.75, -3.00 and -2.62 at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Critical values for the ADF and PP test with a trend are: -4.38, -3.60 and -3.24 at 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels respectively. ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
table A1 reports the results of unit root tests of Augmented 
dickey-Fuller (AdF) and Philips-Perron (PP). Based upon 
the AdF test, three institutional variables are stationary 
at level form at least at 5 percent significance level: law 
and order (lAwor), governmental stability (gstAB), and 
investment profile (inVPro). however, based on PP, all 
variables are non-stationary at level form. All series are 
stationary at first difference form, with either the AdF or 
PP test. Based upon AdF test results, applying the johansen 
procedure to cointegration would not be possible as there is 
a mixture of i(0) and i(1) series. this provides a rationale 
for us to use the bound test approach, or Ardl model, 
proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001).

